Sunday, 18 March 2018

Nervous About Russia



Two weeks ago in Salisbury, less than 10 kilometres from the UK’s Porton Down chemical weapons establishment, a Russian and his daughter appear to have been poisoned. Sergei Skripal was a former Russian military intelligence officer who acted as a spy for the UK’s MI6. In 2006, he had been tried and convicted for high treason by the Russian authorities, but was released in 2010 as part of a ‘spy swap’ with the UK and settled in Britain. Skripal and his daughter remain in a critical condition, with medical staff reporting that they had been poisoned with a nerve agent.
The British government has claimed that the Skripals were poisoned with the nerve agent ‘Novichok’. But in the past two weeks it did not release any proof of this either to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), or to the Russian government that it blames both for producing the agent and for the attack. Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson, UK Foreign Secretary and blathering embodiment of a power in decline, has just revealed that the OPCW will investigate from tomorrow.

Not to be taken: Novichok

Novichok is the name given to a class of extremely toxic nerve agents reported to have been produced by the former Soviet Union and Russia up to 1993. The production took place in several locations, and, with the break up of the Soviet Union, supplies of it and/or knowledge of how to manufacture it could also have been passed on to other countries. It is likely that Porton Down has such knowledge, since that would have been necessary for them to claim the attack on the Skripals was with Novichok rather than something else.

Who dunnit?

Claims that Russia initiated the attack rest on some shaky foundations. It is not clear why such a specialist method was used that would inevitably be linked to the Russian state. Or even why there would be an attempt at assassination at all, unless Skripal had continued to work for the UK intelligence services. However, one could argue that a Russian link was deliberately used to deter other Russian spies who might consider collaborating with the UK – with the message that ‘Eventually, we will punish traitors’.
Less plausible is the view that Putin needed this episode to marshal support in today’s presidential election that will likely result in his fourth term in office. Less plausible still is the Russian argument that the Brits did it to smear Moscow, although anti-Russian hysteria has a long history in Britain so that was a natural reaction.
One notable feature of the UK’s mainstream media coverage of this event was how there was an immediate and unanimous condemnation of Russia, with Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn denounced when he called for evidence.[1] Such is the operation of the ‘free press’.

Winding up

If Russian policy was to poison Sergei Skripal, then, apart from its role as a deterrent, that action could best be understood as a political wind up. The Salisbury location reminds people that the holier-than-though UK also deals in chemical weapons. The rationale for the timing is less clear; although in the wake of Brexit and Trump’s America First policy, the UK is in a weak position to do anything more to Russia than has already been implemented. NATO’s encirclement of Russia is more or less complete, but Russia has now developed new missile systems that undermine this threat. Effective economic sanctions against Russia have probably also reached a limit, because Europe does not want to cut off Russian energy supplies.
Russia can embarrass the UK, an anti-Russian stalwart of the Anglosphere, with little cost. Such an action would also demonstrate that it is not to be trifled with, as already shown by its actions in Syria. By comparison, the Brits have a more appropriate international ambassador than they might have thought in Boris Johnson.

Tony Norfield
18 March 2018


[1] Somewhat inconsistently, Corbyn also agreed with the UK Government’s expulsion of 23 Russian diplomats.

Monday, 12 February 2018

Index of Power


The following chart gives a snapshot of the top 20 countries, ranked by their index of power in the world economy. Readers of this blog or my book, The City, will have seen this concept before,[1] but here the information is updated to 2016-17.

Index of Power, 2016-17

Notes: The height of each bar is given by the country’s total index value, which is then broken down into the respective components. Countries are identified by their two-letter ISO code. Take care, because CH is Switzerland, not China (which is CN), and DE is Germany.
The overall picture shows a small number of countries, led by the US, towering over the rest. Only 33 countries out of 180 have an index that is more than 1% of the US index number! In a chart, most of the columns would look like the x-axis, so here I have shown just the top 20 countries. Of those, only five are close to or above 20% of the US number: the UK, China, Japan, France and Germany.

The UK remains number 2 on these updated figures. But its index value has slipped back in the past few years on most measures, and likely will slip further in future with the impact of Brexit. China stays number 3, but has come in closer, helped by its GDP growth, a greater use of its currency in world markets and by the size of its foreign direct investment assets (FDI).[2] France has edged a little above Germany in the latest ranking, helped by the better relative position of banks in France.
I have excluded from the chart several countries whose ranking is boosted artificially, namely in ways that do not reflect its power. For example, in the latest data the Cayman Islands stood out as an international banking centre and a home of foreign direct investment. But the banks and the assets have little to do with citizens of the Caymans. Ireland and the British Virgin Islands are excluded for similar reasons relating to FDI.

Statistical details

Roughly 180 countries have been taken into account for this ranking. Depending on the statistical measure used, data are available only for 40 to 150 or so.
My five measures are:
- Nominal GDP (2017 estimates, IMF)
- Foreign Direct Investment stock outstanding (at end-2016, UNCTAD)
- Outstanding cross-border lending and borrowing by banks (September 2017, BIS)
- The use of a country’s currency in international markets (April 2016, BIS)
- A country’s military expenditure (2016, SIPRI)
If a country is top in all categories, eg it has the biggest GDP, the biggest military spending, and so forth, then it would have an index number of 100.0. If another country had a GDP half the size of the biggest one, then its number on this measure would be 50; if its FDI were only one-quarter of the biggest country (not necessarily the same country), then its number would be 25; if it had the biggest international bank lending and borrowing, then its number would be 100. Taking each of its five individual measures and dividing by 5 would give the final index number for that country’s power rank. The measures have equal weights.

So what?

The idea behind this chart is to present key features of the world economy in a summary way. At the very least, it gives the lie to the absurd notion that there is an ‘international community’ and instead makes one focus on global power relationships. Each of the measures has limitations, discussed elsewhere, as is true for any set of data. But the evolution of the chart is also useful for tracking how the relative strengths of the major powers change over time.

Tony Norfield, 12 February 2018


[1] See here for one of the early versions, and Chapter 5, ‘The World Hierarchy’, of The City: London and the Global Power of Finance, Verso 2016 and 2017, for a fuller explanation.
[2] Data for Hong Kong and China should be combined, since they are one country. However, there are difficulties. For example, this can easily be done for GDP, but in the case of FDI, most of Hong Kong’s is in China. So I have included only China’s FDI (most of which I believe is outside Hong Kong). In the China data shown, I have added Hong Kong only for GDP and FX. Banking is taken as the average of the two; FDI and military spending is China only. The resulting index number will probably slightly understate China’s importance.

Sunday, 4 February 2018

The Long Arm of the Law No More


By Susil Gupta
The recent appeal case of Mr Thomas O’Connor highlights some of the pitfalls of the British strategy – one has to call it something – of having its cake and eating it in its future relations with the European Union. The case concerns the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) regime and nicely illustrates how law binds European nations together and why British cherry-picking isn’t possible.


Since its introduction in 2002, EAWs have has made a major contribution to law enforcement. Under the scheme, about 5000 people are extradited every year in relation to often serious charges.
Much confusion about the European Arrest Warrant regime arises from the fact that it is often considered an extradition procedure when it is actually designed not to be an extradition procedure.
In international law an extradition procedure is a request from one sovereign State to another sovereign State, both having different jurisdictions. Such a request normally has two stages. A judicial stage where a court considers the legal merit of the received request. If all is in order, and the court approves the request, it is passed on to the executive for final approval. This is always a cumbersome and expensive procedure and may result in frustrating the aims of justice in a requesting country as trials can be held up for years and witnesses and evidence go astray.
The EAW scheme is designed to do away with all this. Courts have only limited powers to review a request, and there is no executive phase. The key element of the scheme is the concept of a ‘common jurisdiction’, that is, all courts within the scheme have sufficiently similar legal regimes to allow the EU to create, by law, a common jurisdiction. The request to ‘extradite’ is simply a request from one court to another.
As is obvious, an assumed ‘common jurisdiction’ can only operate within European Law and has the European Court of Justice (Luxembourg) as its appellate court. A state that leaves the jurisdiction of the European Court, leaves the ‘common jurisdiction’ that is the basis of the EAW scheme.

The facts of the case

Thomas O’Connor, 51, a building company director, was convicted of tax fraud in 2007 in the UK. While on bail, he absconded to Ireland. The UK courts issued an EAW and O’Connor was duly arrested by the Irish police. At first instance, a Dublin court granted the EAW request. O’Connor appealed against the court order and eventually his case came before Ireland’s Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, arguing that, were the extradition granted, O’Connor would still be serving his sentence while the UK would have withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, in effect delivering O’Connor to a country outside the EAW jurisdiction and possibly robbing him of recourse to the European Court.
The Irish Court also referred the case to Luxemburg since the issues raised have wider implications and it will have the final say on the mater. However, given the clear-cut nature of the main issue, it is likely that other EU nations will follow the reasoning of the Irish court.

Whitehall cock-up

Britain is very keen to retain the EAW regime and declared its intention to stay with the scheme within weeks of the Brexit referendum in 2016.
Many of its criminals have a tendency to flee its jurisdiction, often for sunnier climes on the south coast of Spain. It is also a cheap and efficient way to get rid of criminal foreign nationals. Brexiters tend also to be hard on crime so no political price to be paid for “remaining in Europe” on this issue.
Didn’t anyone in government realise that withdrawing from European law and its judicial structures might pose a serious problem and strike at the legal foundations of European cross-border law enforcement? Apparently not, amazing as it may seem for a country that prides itself on the rule of law and judicial oversight!
In March last year, Home Secretary Amber Rudd told Parliament that she ruled out any possibility of Britain leaving the EAW mechanism describing it as “an effective tool and that is absolutely essential to delivering effective judgment to the murderers, rapists and paedophiles.” But Lord Paddick, once a high-ranking officer in the Metropolitan Police, was quick to point out the obvious “The Government has to explain how this can be done without European Court of Justice oversight and common data standards.”
As late as September 2017 the UK issued a policy paper – Security, law enforcement and criminal justice: a future partnership paper – that made a strong commitment to remaining within the structures of European law enforcement including, Europol’s 2017 Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment, Passenger Name Records (PNR) data collection, the Schengen Information System Alert system, Europol´s Internet Referral Unit (IRU), Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment, the Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce, PrĂ¼m (a system for rapid law enforcement information exchange on fingerprints, DNA and Vehicle Registration Data), Eurodac (a mechanism for sharing fingerprint data for asylum and law enforcement purposes), etc. The 20-page paper firmly asserts that law enforcement after Brexit it will be “business as usual” – but fails to consider any legal issue. Within two months of the paper’s publication, the Irish Times was reporting that EAW cases at the Irish Courts might face problems.
As a consequence, the Irish Court’s ruling has serious implications for crime in the UK. The internet and cross-border economic activities allow criminals to commit offences in the UK from the safety of a number of European countries beyond the reach of the British police. Likewise, any British criminal who does not fancy facing serving a hefty sentence is now only a plane or train ticket away from freedom. Why should any European police force spend valuable resources monitoring and tracking British criminals abroad if they cannot be extradited? Many other law enforcement facilities and activities are likely to be affected because all of them are subject to the legal oversight of European law and its judicial institutions.
So, soon it will no longer be true that Scotland Yard always gets its man.

4 February 2018

Tuesday, 23 January 2018

Warren Buffett & Imperial Economics


Warren Buffett is one of the wealthiest people in the world. He is also Chairman of the Board, President and Chief Executive Officer of Berkshire Hathaway, a huge US investment conglomerate. Looking at Berkshire’s investment policy reveals some important features of the economics of imperialism today and the role of money capitalists. Buffett’s public image as a kindly old gentleman – the Sage of Omaha – who favours increasing taxes on the rich and donates to charitable causes, does not sit well with evidence that he is a predatory gouger of profit. But these are the times in which we live.[1]

Berkshire’s nondescript name belies the fact that it is the fifth or sixth largest publicly quoted company by market capitalisation, at more than $500bn. It owns an extraordinarily wide range of companies, from insurance and banking, to specialist engineering, consumer electronics, news media, real estate, energy, railroads and airlines. Berkshire has more than 240 subsidiaries, but in addition to these it has large and small equity stakes in many other companies. Some are enterprises that few have heard of; others are household names. Six big companies account for nearly 70% of its $180bn portfolio of equity holdings: Apple, Coca Cola, Kraft Heinz, American Express, Bank of America and Wells Fargo bank.
Warren Buffett’s business strategy has not always been successful. He has made a number of duff investments, not least an early one in the textiles business that gave his company its name. Subsequent failures include investments in IBM and Tesco, and he was quite late into the boom in ‘technology’ stocks, having viewed these with a traditionalist’s scepticism. But his fund has nevertheless registered dramatic returns over a long period, well above those that would have been gained from investing in a broad index of companies. Like some other companies reviewed on this blog, Berkshire Hathaway does not pay dividends to its investors, relying upon an increasing share price to keep them happy. So far they have been content: from close to $100,000 in early 2010, the share price had risen to more than $300,000 by early 2018, to become the most expensive share in history.[2]
As one might expect, Berkshire Hathaway uses its financial strength to negotiate deals to its advantage, and there are two guiding themes for its investments. Firstly, Berkshire looks for companies with brand loyalty and potential or actual monopolistic positions that are likely to keep future profits secure. Secondly, as far as possible, it wants only to allocate money capital and not to get involved in business operations.

Monopoly sectors and Berkshire investments

The market power of a monopolist is a wonderful thing – if you are the monopolist. There is rarely only one supplier unchallenged by rivals. But being one of very few suppliers, or having a government contract that guarantees high prices for your product, or using advertising and brand recognition to cement market domination, or building a commercial barrier to limit what competitors can do, or using patents to stall their development, are all means of building a favourable position in the market. These are the kinds of company, big and small, that Berkshire Hathaway seeks.
On the big side is Apple. Although he was late to the party, Buffett started jumping into Apple’s shares in 2016, after its price had fallen over the previous year. By late 2017, Berkshire had accumulated more than $20bn in Apple shares, some 2.5% of the company. The rationale for this investment was that Apple had an ‘ecosystem’ and level of brand loyalty that meant consumers were not very sensitive to the exorbitant charges it makes for its products, particularly the iPhone – as revealed in Apple’s confidence when putting a premium price on the iPhone X.
Other large companies include not only the well-known ones like Coca Cola and Kraft Heinz, noted above, but also those that usually remain out of sight. Take energy distribution, for example.
Berkshire owns 99% of Berkshire Hathaway Energy. In addition to its businesses in the US and Canada, this subsidiary owns two of the fourteen ‘distribution network operators’ in the UK. Each of these UK operators is a regional monopoly; there are five other holding companies owning the remaining twelve. Berkshire’s are managed by its Northern Powergrid company, with operations in Yorkshire and the North East of England.
When people complain about high costs of gas and electricity, it is usually the energy producing companies that get the blame, not the distributors. But the latter are often responsible for something like 25% of a household’s energy bill through the distribution prices they charge the producers. In 2016-17, Northern Powergrid (Yorkshire)’s total revenues were £417m and a high proportion of those, nearly half, were its operating profit of £199m.
Berkshire also invests in many smaller companies, often those in a strong niche position. Examples are Precision Castparts (metal components and castings), IMC Group (tungsten carbide metal cutting tools) and Lubrizol (specialist chemicals). These are an important component of the holding company’s returns.
Berkshire’s funds come in both from its direct subsidiaries and from its portfolio of equity investments and interest bearing securities. Its many investments give a claim on revenues from all areas of the economy, both nationally (in the US) and internationally.[3] This is shown by the breakdown of its $25.9bn earnings (profits) before taxes in 2016. Insurance underwriting brought in $2.1bn, with an additional $4.6bn of earnings from the portfolio investments of its insurance division. BNSF, its railroad freight division, brought in $5.7bn, Berkshire Hathaway Energy $3.0bn, its manufacturing subsidiaries $6.2bn, with the remainder from a variety of other businesses and investments.

Being a money capitalist

Many big corporations today do as little production themselves as they can get away with. Instead they monopolise design, technology patents and marketing, while the producers of the goods and services they control become part of their ‘value chains’. Owning many producing, transport and servicing companies, Berkshire Hathaway would not seem to be doing this. But it has its own way of working, as spelled out in its latest annual report:
operating businesses are managed on an unusually decentralized basis. There are essentially no centralized or integrated business functions (such as sales, marketing, purchasing, legal or human resources) and there is minimal involvement by Berkshire’s corporate headquarters in the day-to-day business activities of the operating businesses.”
In other words, Berkshire may buy out a company and allocate extra capital for investment, but, although it may choose the Chief Executive of the operating business, the holding company stays clear of directly managing anything. This shows Berkshire’s role as money capitalist, even for its operating businesses, quite apart from those companies in which it just holds a portfolio stake.
The funds for Berkshire’s investments are mainly held by its insurance division – a large volume of mostly US dollar-denominated cash, cash equivalents and US Treasury Bills, which amounted to $71bn at end-2016 (total cash, etc, available was $86bn). A portion of those funds may be required to meet payments on insurance and reinsurance policies. But more importantly, this is also a store of cash to use for the opportunistic gouging of other capitalists, especially in times of crisis when cash is king.
Berkshire has often acted as a lender of last resort to selected companies in trouble. They are willing to pay a premium cost for its funds, not only because they have little choice, but also because backing from a big, well-known investor helps restore some financial market confidence in their business. In this type of investment, Berkshire has purchased ‘preference shares’ paying a high fixed rate of interest and which can only be bought back by the company at a premium, usually around 10%. As part of these preference shares, the company may also issue Berkshire long-dated options to buy the company’s stock at very favourable prices.
Examples of such deals include Berkshire investing $5bn in the preferred stock of Goldman Sachs back in 2008. This stock yielded an annual interest rate of 10%. Goldman bought it back in 2011, but had to pay $5.5bn. Berkshire also gained from the stock options it received. Similarly, Berkshire bought $5bn of Bank of America’s preference stock in 2011, although market conditions were not quite so bad and the yield was 6%. Other companies that have been through this Berkshire process include General Electric, Dow, Wrigley, Kraft Heinz and Home Capital.

Buffett and the law of value

Berkshire Hathaway’s business is an example of how a big corporation is often bigger than you think. Its fortunes derive from the operation of hundreds of companies it owns directly and from its myriad of investments that stake a claim on the value produced worldwide, even though most of Berkshire’s business looks US-based. Its mode of operation also responds to how the imperialist world economy works today. Do not just look for a ‘good company’ to invest in, but find the ones with a more protected niche in the market. Do not just lend to a company with ‘good prospects’, but wait to pounce on those with a future that are desperate enough to accept your terms.
Warren Buffett is quite abstemious and gets a relatively small salary for being the Chairman and CEO of a major corporation. Nevertheless, he is one of the top 10 richest people on the planet, with a large income from his personal investments as well as the wealth represented by his Berkshire holdings. Buffett owns some 18% of Berkshire Hathaway’s shares and, like some of his plutocrat peers, he has also organised the company’s shareholdings so that his voting power is higher than this, at nearly 32% of the total.[4]
He has many fans and receives the kinds of accolade that would go to a sports team with a great track record. But this is not a game; it is the world economy, and Buffett’s fund is a prime example of the power of parasitism today. Berkshire ‘puts money to work’ by relying upon the work of others, and it siphons off the product of social labour into the fortunes of private investors.

Tony Norfield, 23 January 2018


[1] This review of Berkshire Hathaway extends the list of corporations covered on this blog. Earlier ones were: Apple, Alibaba, Amazon, Facebook and Alphabet/Google. I do not plan to give a comprehensive overview of Berkshire’s operations, for which see Wikipedia and other Internet sources. Here I want to focus on key points that illustrate the nature of imperial economics today. Information cited is mainly from Berkshire’s accounts.
[2] This is the price of the main Class A shares. See footnote 4 for further details.
[3] When looking at the details, I was surprised that little of Berkshire’s revenue seems to come directly from non-US sources. A lot of Buffett’s attention seems to have been spent scouring the nooks and crannies of the domestic US economy for profitable openings and to buy into cheapened assets. Berkshire owns stakes in airlines, regional newspapers, real estate brokerages and automobile dealerships, among other things.
[4] Berkshire’s Class A shares are the ones that are priced around $300,000 each. The company also has Class B shares that are priced around 1,500th of the A shares, but have only one 10,000th of the voting power. There are 1.65bn Class A shares authorised and 3.225bn Class B shares.

Friday, 19 January 2018

Worse Than You Think


Michael Wolff, Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House, Little Brown, 2018

This book is fun to read and a best seller. Everyone loves a gossipy book about someone they dislike. Fluently written, although not well written, it is built mainly on interviews with those in and around the Trump White House. Wolff takes us through the plots and screw-ups of this double-dealing menagerie with relish.
Much of what the book says will not be new to those following The Donald. Probably the most striking new point Wolff makes is that part of the reason for the political and administrative chaos is that Trump was not expecting to win the presidential election and become POTUS #45. The insiders on Team Trump were perfectly happy to lose, as long as the margin was not too big. Up to the last minute that was what they were betting on. Losing like that would have been a ‘victory’, especially because it would do wonders for the Trump family brand name. Winning for real would carry the risk of a closer examination of the Trump family’s finances and put all their schemes in the public spotlight.
However, Wolff’s journalistic approach does not get to grips with some fundamental issues. Wolff gives many amusing stories of Trump’s egotistical self-deception, mind-boggling inconsistencies and shameless invention of ‘facts’. Trump may think he is multi-tasking, but sitting on his bed eating a cheeseburger, watching three cable TV channels at once while making phone calls is more a signal of not being able to concentrate on anything at all. Such character traits have recently led to questions about Trump’s mental health, and also the hope in liberal quarters that this might be a means of getting him to resign. Yet these factors, while important features of his presidency, do not give the proper context for what is going on.
Trump is not the only president to have been a few sandwiches short of a picnic. In recent history, just consider Ronald Reagan and George ‘Dubya’ Bush. Or what about Barack Obama, the great black hope of liberal America, who in eight years failed to close Guantanamo Bay concentration camp and instead became drone-killer in chief, a Nobel Peace Prize winner up to his neck in covert operations? The point to recognise is that it does not matter much who is the president, the imperial machine grinds on.
Where Trump has been an anomaly is that he came from outside the political establishment. This meant that there were fewer pre-arranged ties into the networks of political force and influence, from Congressional interest groups and big business, to the CIA and the military. That Trump has been reliant upon a small group of trusted acolytes and chancers is not so unusual. That these have been made up largely from his family is more so, since with Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner he has gone several steps beyond Bill Clinton’s promotion of Hillary. This anomalous regime has produced some embarrassments for America’s self-image. Apart from the stream of reactionary consciousness tweets, there is the border wall with Mexico, pulling out of the Paris Climate Accord and much else besides.
The question is then: how could this have happened? Of course, Wolff recognises that Trump is an outsider. But he does not dwell upon how such an outsider could win the presidency, except to review the events in the 2016 election campaign. In other words, what were the social forces behind this anomaly occurring? Wolff’s coverage of the alt-right pundit and Trump ideas man Steve Bannon notes his financial backing from the billionaire Robert Mercer, but he does not discuss why the America First, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, racist policies Bannon supports gained so many votes for Trump in the US electorate.
It remains uncomfortable for Trump’s critics that resurgent nationalism in an imperialist country looks so ugly when spewing unfiltered from Trump’s mouth. That is part of the reason to blame Russia for Trump’s election victory – if it was the Commies evil Russkies, then they can avoid facing the problem that a large part of the US electorate agrees with these policies.
It is depressing fact that in imperialist countries a squeeze on the economic lives of people usually results in political reaction. There may be brave dissidents and protests, but these are outweighed by mass opinion that calls upon the state to punish foreigners and any others they see as responsible for undermining their privileges. What has emerged from this cauldron of discontent is Trump, not a radical current that challenges imperialism.
For now, Trump’s sociopathic tweetarama will continue. But it is only a matter of time before the imperial machine takes back full control to limit disruption to the way US imperialism presents itself to the world, which can also have a big impact on business. In the interim, Trump’s tax cuts for the rich and for corporations are not a problem, and in late December the US Congress passed these plans.

Tony Norfield, 19 January 2018

Saturday, 23 December 2017

Some Books #2


These are some of the better books I have read in the past year, and ones to look for if you want to find out about …

The British Labour Movement and Ireland

Geoffrey Bell, Hesitant Comrades: The Irish Revolution and the British Labour Movement, Pluto Press, 2016
This book is an interesting study that undermines the notion that the British labour movement was ever progressive when faced with a challenge to British imperialism. Its focus is on Britain and Ireland in the early 20th century, and it shows there was only some limited support for Irish freedom from British rule in British cities where there were many Irish workers. Neither the mainstream workers’ organisations, nor the more radical ones, took up the issue in any substantial way. This leads Bell to his book’s title of ‘hesitant comrades’. The Catholic Herald summed it all up in March 1920: ‘Ireland is in the throes of a national agony, a victim of merciless militarism, and British Labour remains quiescent and inactive’ (p. 218).
William O’Brien of the Irish TUC and Labour Party had made a similar point a year after the 1916 Easter Rising. Addressing delegates at the Leeds Convention in 1917, he said: ‘In Ireland you have a small nationality at your door which is demanding the right of its own life, … I gather from reading some of the capitalist papers that revolution is popular nowadays. Twelve months ago you had a revolution in Ireland. The papers and politicians that acclaimed the revolution in Russia did not acclaim the revolution in Ireland whose leaders were taken out and shot like dogs’ (pp. 217-218).
Even Sylvia Pankhurst’s Workers’ Dreadnought sidelined the issue of Irish freedom from political oppression by belittling the Sinn Fein-supporting nationalists. It promoted hopes for the class struggle instead. It is tricky to follow the development of inconsistent comments by labour movement radicals. But while some, like the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), ended up being more ‘theoretically’ correct, they still did next to nothing about the issue, or even wrote much about it.
All the workers’ organisations wanted to avoid the question of sectarianism in Ulster, which was replicated in the working class in Liverpool, Glasgow and elsewhere. Confronting sectarianism would also have caused problems for the trade unions. So they blamed sectarianism on Unionist politicians, like Carson, and on the British Government, and downplayed the material basis for the support of anti-Catholic policies among the Protestant-Loyalist working class.
In the second half of 1921, after anti-Catholic pogroms by the Ulster Loyalists, CPGB member William Paul, in his pamphlet Irish Crisis, said: ‘The peculiar psychology of Orangeism … with its fierce and violent hatred against its enemies will be easily diverted against a capitalist class during a revolutionary crisis. It was Carson who taught them how to arm against the status quo … When the workers move against Capitalism, the revolutionary movement of Ulster will have good reason for thanking Carson for his magnificent work’ (p. 191). This view rested on the delusion that somehow the loyalist workers’ ‘fierce and violent hatred’ towards Catholics would be overcome in a ‘move against Capitalism’. It dishonestly used the mirage of future workers’ unity to avoid dealing with the ugly reality of the day.
The left sometimes recognised how Ireland’s struggle was a political embarrassment. For example, in June 1920 the British Communist paper, The Call, said: “The suppression of Ireland is one of the world’s great crimes; the silence of Englishmen is one of the tragedies” (p. 111). But despite this, and other, similar statements by the CPGB in 1920-21, they did little about it. To say the least, they would have scored few points when measured on the Bolshevik reckoning of how many Communist supporters had been imprisoned for their agitation on Ireland.


The British and India

Shashi Tharoor, Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India, Hurst & Co, 2017
Tharoor is an Indian politician, and a good polemicist. Two points stood out for me in this well-written book. Firstly, he does a good job of confronting Niall Ferguson, the historian and apologist for British (and American) imperialism, on the subject of India. This illustrates how a polemic can provide a useful theme for guiding the exposition of an argument.
Secondly, and for me the most interesting parts of the book, were not where he detailed how the British destroyed the Indian textile industry to promote India’s imports of British textile products – often woollen clothes that were completely unsuited to India’s climate. This has been covered many times by others. The new point for me was where he showed how British domination undermined India’s commercial shipping sector and its shipbuilding industry, an industry that, at the time, was at least as advanced as the British one. This resulted from British commercial power, setting the rules on what ships could be used between British controlled ports and also who could run that business. Commercial power is often greatly underestimated by those who focus only on industry, and these examples help explain more fully Britain’s exploitation of India.


Machinations in the Middle East

Christopher Davidson, Shadow Wars: The Secret Struggle for the Middle East, One World, 2016
This book is a good, easy to read, although lengthy review of events in the Middle East and Northern Africa. It will help a lot in understanding the background to present day news stories, since it details of the actions both of the major powers – the US, Britain and France in particular – and of the different political groupings in the region. There is a welcome coverage of countries from Nigeria, to Libya, to Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey, with comprehensive information on the supporters of ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Al-Nusra, Boko Haram, etc.
Davidson has incorporated a mass of material into the book, providing some important details that even close observers of these events are likely to have missed. His 2,500 footnotes are encyclopedic, even to excess, covering 121 of the near-700 pages, but they do give useful documentation that can be used by those doing research on these issues. However, although in many places the book gives a useful summary of the relevant historical background, its disadvantage is that it reads more like an extended news review. This is at the cost of giving a more theoretical assessment of what is going on and explaining how this results from the latest phase of imperial disintegration.


The Balfour Declaration, British Support for Zionism

David Cronin, Balfour’s Shadow: A Century of British Support for Zionism and Israel, Pluto Press, 2017
This book does what it says in the title, and reviews British government policy towards Palestine and Zionism from the time of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 up to the present day. There are more twists and turns in this story than it is easy to summarise here, but I would recommend Cronin’s work as well-written, well-documented and mercifully concise!
Although it covers some similar ground, I would also recommend reading John Newsinger’s telling critique of the British Labour Party and Zionism, available here.

Tony Norfield, 23 December 2017

Tuesday, 21 November 2017

Mugabe, Land, Thatcher, Blair & Imperialism


So, farewell then, Robert Mugabe, ruler of Zimbabwe for 37 years. As the western media celebrate your demise, and Zimbabwe’s people wonder what will happen next, it is worth making a note of some forgotten events that helped pave the way for your country’s crisis. As one might expect, this involves the Brits. Perhaps less anticipated, it also involves the Labour Government from 1997.


One key question for an African country like Zimbabwe fighting off racist colonialism was that whites had held all the best land. This made land reform critical for some version of economic justice and liberation for the mass of people. But the Lancaster House agreement, managed by the British in 1979 to oversee the transition from white minority rule, pressured Mugabe into delaying any serious land reform for another 10 years. The British and American governments, worried about Soviet influence in the region, offered to compensate white citizens for any land they sold and a fund was established, to operate from 1980 to 1990.
Lack of money to assist agricultural investment, with funds only available to compensate the white landowners, meant that Zimbabwe’s land reform was doomed to fail. Thatcher’s government from 1979 allocated those funds for compensation and many landless people were resettled, but in 1997 Tony Blair’s ever-so-progressive New Labour stopped even that. Clare Short, Blair’s Secretary of State for International Development, told Mugabe’s government in November 1997 that while Labour might be willing to assist in some ‘poverty eradication’ it would not continue to help with land reform. Blair repudiated all commitments to help on this, so Mugabe responded by forcibly confiscating white farms without compensation. While this got popular support, it exacerbated Zimbabwe’s economic problems. These were worsened from 2001 by economic sanctions the ‘British Commonwealth’ and other imperialists imposed on the country.
This is not to excuse Mugabe’s politics. It is just to illustrate a more general rule that imperialism, even in its ‘Labour’ forms, cannot be trusted.

Tony Norfield, 21 November 2017